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Thanks to the single-photon interference at a third untrusted party, the twin-field quantun key
distribution (TF-QKD) protocol and its variants can beat the well-known rate-loss bound without
quantum repeaters, and related experiments have been implemented recently. To adopt the standard
decoy-state method, most of these protocols and experiments assume that the phase of coherent
state sources should be continuously randomized. However, such a crucial assumption cannot be
well satisfied in experimental implementations, which opens a loophole to deteriorate the practical
security. In this paper, we propose a TF-QKD variant with discrete-phase-randomized sources to
bridge this gap, and prove its security against collective attacks. Our simulation results indicate that,
with only a small number of discrete phases, the performance of discrete-phase-randomized sources
can overcome the rate-loss bound and approach that of continuous-phase-randomized sources.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] can provide two legitimate peers Alice and Bob with information-theoretic
secret keys, even in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Due to the advantage of theoretic security, a lot of QKD
experiments aimed at high rate and long distance have been completed[3–7]. Despite these impressive achievements,
their performance is restricted by the fundamental rate-loss limit[8, 9], which was believed to be true for any point-
to-point QKD without quantum repeaters. Surprisingly, this limit was broken by twin-field QKD (TF-QKD)[10] and
its corresponding variants[11–16]. Because of this theoretic breakthrough, related TF-QKD experiments [17–22] have
been demonstrated subsequently.
Among all these TF-QKD schemes, the decoy-state method [23, 24] is adopted in the test mode to estimate the
eavesdropper’s information or the phase error rate, and this means that the phase of coherent sources should be
continuously and uniformly modulated in [0, 2pi). Generally, to generate the so-called continuous-phase-randomized
pulses, one can turn on and off a laser or randomly modulate the phase of coherent sources controlled by a random
number generator. However, the continuity and uniformity of phases in the former case are difficult to verify, and
thus may introduce potential loopholes [25, 26], and phases in the latter case are essentially discrete, which cannot be
directly thought to be continuous. Hence, the genuine continuous-phase-randomized pulses are difficult to generate
in practical implementation with current technology.
In this paper, inspired by the idea in [16, 27], we propose a TF-QKD protocol with discrete-phase-randomized
sources to bypass the necessity of continuous-phase-randomized pulses. That is, both in the code mode and
test mode, Alice (Bob) prepares coherent states whose phase is randomly chosen from
{
2pix
M |x = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1
}
(
{
2piy
M |y = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1
}
), where M denotes the number of discrete phases modulated by Alice (Bob). Simulation
results indicate that, with only a small number of discrete phases, the performance of our protocol can overcome the
rate-loss bound and approach that of continuous-phase-randomized sources.
II. TF-QKD WITH DISCRETE-PHASE-RANDOMIZED SOURCES
First, we give the procedure of TF-QKD with discrete-phase-randomized sources as follows:
(1) Alice (Bob) randomly chooses the code mode or test mode in each trial.
(1.a) If a code mode is selected, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses a key bit ka (kb) and a random number x
(y) to prepare a coherent state
∣∣√µei(kapi+2pix/M)〉 (∣∣√µei(kbpi+2piy/M)〉), where ka, kb ∈ {0, 1}, x, y ∈
{0, 1, 2, · · · ,M − 1}, and M denotes the number of discrete phases modulated by Alice (Bob).
(1.b) If a test mode is selected, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses an intensity ξa (ξb) and a random number x (y)
to prepare a coherent state
∣∣√ξaei(2pix/M)〉 (∣∣√ξbei(2piy/M)〉), where ξa, ξb ∈ {µ, ν, ω}.
(2) Alice and Bob transmit their quantum states to a third party Eve. An honest Eve interferes the states on
a 50:50 beam splitter, directs the two output pulses to two threshold detectors L and R, and announces her
measurement results. Only three measurement results are acceptable by Alice and Bob, that is, only detector
L clicks, only detector R clicks, and no detectors click. Here, both detectors L and R click is considered as no
detectors click. Note that, the security of this protocol does not rely on whether Eve is honest or not.
(3) They repeat the above steps many times. For the successful measurement (only detector L or R clicks), Alice
and Bob announce the corresponding mode for each trial.
(3.a) For trials in the code mode, Alice and Bob announce their x and y. If x = y or x = y ±M/2, they keep
ka and kb as their raw key bit. If x = y ±M/2, Bob flips his key bit kb. Moreover, if Eve announces only
detector R clicks, Bob flips his key bit kb.
(3.b) For trials in the test mode, Alice and Bob announce ξa, x, ξb, and y, and they only keep trials x = y or
x = y ±M/2, and ξa = ξb to calculate gains. For simplicity, assuming M is an even number.
(4) Alice and Bob perform key reconciliation and privacy amplification to get the final secret keys.
Here, we present the security of our protocol. In the test mode, when ξa = ξb = ξ and x = y, the composite states
of Alice and Bob shared can be written as
ρAB =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
∣∣√ξei(2pix/M)〉
A
〈√
ξei(2pix/M)
∣∣⊗ ∣∣√ξei(2pix/M)〉
B
〈√
ξei(2pix/M)
∣∣,
=
M−1∑
k=0
P ξM (k)
∣∣∣λξk,+
〉
AB
〈
λξk,+
∣∣∣ ,
(1)
where P ξM (k) =
∞∑
l=0
e−2ξ(2ξ)lM+k
(lM+k)! ,
∣∣∣λξk,+
〉
AB
= e
−ξ√
P ξM (k)
∞∑
l=0
(
√
2ξ)lM+k√
(lM+k)!
|lM + k,+〉AB is dependent on the intensity ξ,
and |n,+〉AB = 1√2nn! (a† + b†)n|00〉AB.
3When ξa = ξb = ξ and x = y ±M/2, the composite states of Alice and Bob can be written as
ρAB =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
∣∣√ξei(2pix/M)〉
A
〈√
ξei(2pix/M)
∣∣⊗ ∣∣−√ξei(2pix/M)〉
B
〈−√ξei(2pix/M)∣∣,
=
M−1∑
k=0
P ξM (k)
∣∣∣λξk,−
〉
AB
〈
λξk,−
∣∣∣ ,
(2)
where
∣∣∣λξk,−
〉
AB
= e
−ξ√
P ξM (k)
∞∑
l=0
(
√
2ξ)lM+k√
(lM+k)!
|lM + k,−〉AB is dependent on the intensity ξ, and |n,−〉AB = 1√2nn!(a† − b†)n|00〉AB.
Next, we show how to bound Eve’s Helevo information. Generally, Eve’s collective attack can be given by
U
∣∣∣λξk,±
〉
AB
|e〉E =
√
Y ξ,Lk,±
∣∣∣γξ,Lk,±
〉
|L〉+
√
Y ξ,Rk,±
∣∣∣γξ,Rk,±
〉
|R〉+
√
Y ξ,Nk,±
∣∣∣γξ,Nk,±
〉
|N〉 , (3)
where |e〉E is Eve’s ancillary state; |L〉, |R〉, and |N〉 denote Eve’s measurement results;
∣∣∣γξ,Lk,±
〉
,
∣∣∣γξ,Rk,±
〉
, and
∣∣∣γξ,Nk,±
〉
are some arbitrary quantum states referring to Eve’s measurement results |L〉, |R〉, and |N〉; Y ξ,Lk,± , Y ξ,Rk,± ,and Y ξ,Nk,±
satisfying Y ξ,Lk,± + Y
ξ,R
k,± + Y
ξ,N
k,± = 1 are yields referring to |L〉, |R〉, and |N〉. Generally, we have Y ξ,Lk,+ = Y ξ,Rk,−
∆
= Y ξ,ck
and Y ξ,Rk,+ = Y
ξ,L
k,−
∆
= Y ξ,ek , and Y
ξ
k
∆
= Y ξ,ck +Y
ξ,e
k . Note that, the yield Y
ξ
k is dependent on the intensity ξ. For different
intensities ξa and ξb, Y
ξa
k and Y
ξb
k can be bounded by
∣∣∣Y ξak −Y ξbk
∣∣∣ ≤√1−F 2ξaξb,k, where Fξaξb,k =
∣∣∣〈λξak |λξbk
〉∣∣∣ [27].
In the code mode, the state prepared by Alice and Bob in the matched trials x = y can be expressed as
∣∣√µei(2pix/M)〉 ∣∣√µei(2pix/M)〉=M−1∑
k=0
ei(2pikx/M)
√
PµM (k) |λµk ,+〉 , ka = kb = 0,
∣∣−√µei(2pix/M)〉 ∣∣−√µei(2pix/M)〉 = M−1∑
k=0
ei(2pikx/M+pik)
√
PµM (k) |λµk ,+〉 , ka = kb = 1,
∣∣√µei(2pix/M)〉 ∣∣−√µei(2pix/M)〉 = M−1∑
k=0
ei(2pikx/M)
√
PµM (k) |λµk ,−〉 , ka = 0, kb = 1,
∣∣−√µei(2pix/M)〉 ∣∣√µei(2pix/M)〉 = M−1∑
k=0
ei(2pikx/M+pik)
√
PµM (k) |λµk ,−〉 , ka = 1, kb = 0,
(4)
For ease of notation, define
∣∣∣ψµ,L/Rk,±
〉
∆
=
√
PµM (k)Y
µ,L/R
k,±
∣∣∣γµ,L/Rk,±
〉
,
∣∣∣ψµ,L/Rex,±
〉
∆
=
M/2−1∑
k=0
ei(2pix/M)2k
∣∣∣ψµ,L/R2k,±
〉
, and
∣∣∣ψµ,L/Rox,±
〉
∆
=
M/2−1∑
k=0
ei(2pix/M)(2k+1)
∣∣∣ψµ,L/R2k+1,±
〉
. After Eve announcing the measurement result, Alice and Bob only
keep the matched events. Without loss of generality, we consider the case when Eve’s result is |L〉. Eve’s state
conditioned on Alice’s classical bit is
ρµ,LA′E,x =
1
4 |0〉A′ 〈0| ⊗
(
P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉
+
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,+
〉
}+ P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉
+
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉
}
)
+ 14 |1〉A′ 〈1| ⊗
(
P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉
−
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,+
〉
}+ P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉
−
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉
}
)
,
(5)
where P{|x〉} = |x〉 〈x|. And Eve’s state can be written as
ρµ,LE,x =
1
2
(
P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉
}+ P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,+
〉
}+ P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉
}+ P{
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉
}
)
. (6)
Hence, the probability that Alice obtains a sifted key bit when Eve announces |L〉 is
Qµ,Lx =
1
2
(∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,+
〉∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉∣∣∣2
)
. (7)
and the corresponding error rate is
eµ,Lx =
∣∣∣
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉∣∣∣2+
∣∣∣
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉∣∣∣2∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,+
〉∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣
∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉∣∣∣2+
∣∣∣
∣∣∣ψµ,Lox,−
〉∣∣∣2
2Qµ,Lx
. (8)
4Then, with the strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy and Jesen’s inequality, Eve’s Holevo information when
she announces |L〉 is upper bounded by
Iµ,LAE,x ≤ (1 − eµ,Lx )H(
∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉∣∣∣2
2(1− eµ,Lx )Qµ,Lx
) + eµ,Lx H(
∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉∣∣∣2
2eµ,Lx Q
µ,L
x
) ≤ H(
∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,+
〉∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,Lex,−
〉∣∣∣2
2Qµ,Lx
), (9)
where H(x) = −xlog2x−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy. For each matched trial when Eve announces
|L〉, the secret key rate is
Rµ,Lx = Q
µ,L
x (1− fH(eµ,Lx )− Iµ,LAE,x), (10)
where f is the inefficiency of key reconciliation. Consequently, the average secret key rate when Eve announces |L〉 is
RL =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
Rµ,Lx =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Lx (1 − fH(eµ,Lx )− Iµ,LAE,x). (11)
With Jensen’s inequality, the minimum of RL can be bounded by
RL ≥ Qµ,L(1− fH(eµ,L)− Iµ,LAE ), (12)
where Qµ,L = 1M
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Lx , e
µ,L =
(
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Lx e
µ,L
x
)
/
(
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Lx
)
, and Iµ,LAE = H(
M/2−1∑
k=0
||ψµ,L2k,+〉|2+||ψµ,L2k,−〉|2
2Qµ,L
).
Similarly, the average secret key rate when Eve announces |R〉 is given by
RR ≥ Qµ,R(1− fH(eµ,R)− Iµ,RAE ), (13)
where Qµ,R = 1M
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Rx , e
µ,R =
(
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Rx e
µ,R
x
)
/
(
M−1∑
x=0
Qµ,Rx
)
, and Iµ,RAE = H(
M/2−1∑
k=0
||ψµ,R2k,+〉|2+||ψµ,R2k,−〉|2
2Qµ,R ).
Hence, the total secret key rate of the matched trials x = y is Rm = R
L +RR. Again, with Jesen’s inequality, the
total secret key rate can be minimized as
Rm ≥ 1
M
Qµ(1 − fH(eµ)− IµAE), (14)
where Qµ = Qµ,L + Qµ,R, eµ = Q
µ,Leµ,L+Qµ,Reµ,R
Q , and I
µ
AE = H(
1
2Qµ
M/2−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,L2k,+
〉∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,L2k,+
〉∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣ψµ,R2k,+
〉∣∣∣2 +
∣∣∣
∣∣∣ψµ,R2k,+
〉∣∣∣2) = H( 1Qµ
M/2−1∑
k=0
PµM (2k)Y
µ
2k).
Similarly, the secret key rate of the opposite trials x = y ±M/2 is
Ro ≥ 1
M
Qµ(1 − fH(eµ)− IµAE), (15)
Combining both the matched trials and opposite trials, the total secret key rate of our protocol is
R = Rm +Ro ≥ 2
M
Qµ(1 − fH(eµ)− IµAE). (16)
To minimize the total secret key rate R, we need to maximize IµAE . The numerical routines to maximize I
µ
AE is given
by
max IµAE = H(
1
Qµ
M/2−1∑
k=0
PµM (2k)Y
µ
2k)
s.t.Qξ=
M−1∑
k=0
P ξM (k)Y
ξ
k , ξ ∈ {µ, ν, ω}∣∣∣Y ξak −Y ξbk
∣∣∣ ≤√1−F 2ξaξb,k, ξa 6= ξb
M/2−1∑
k=0
PµM (2k)Y
µ
2k ≤ Q
µ
2 .
(17)
5III. SIMULATION
For a typical implementation of TF-QKD, we assume the dark count rate and the detection efficiency of single
photon detectors are 8 × 10−8 and 14.5% respectively, the intrinsic misalignment error is 1.5%, and the inefficiency
of key reconciliation is 1.15. With these system parameters, we simulate the performance of TF-QKD with different
number of discrete phases. To maximize the performance of protocol, the intensities of µ and ν are optimized, and
the intensity of ω is set to be 0. The corresponding secret key rate is illustrated in Fig. 1.
It can be seen that, with discrete phase randomization both in the code mode and test mode, the secret key rate
of M = 4 cannot break the POLB bound, the secret key rate of M = 6 can break the PLOB bound, and M = 10
can almost reach the maximal channel loss of M →∞. Moreover, with the increase of M , the tolerable channel loss
becomes higher due to the more accurate estimation of Eve’s information, as a tradeoff, the secret key rate becomes
lower due to the sifting factor 1/M . Hence, in practical implementation of TF-QKD, modulating finite discrete phases
is adequate to ensure both the security and performance.
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FIG. 1. Results of the secret key rate with respect to the channel loss between Alice and Bob. The solid line represents the
PLOB bound[9], and the curves represent the secret key rates of TF-QKD with M = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 respectively. Since the secret
key rate of M → ∞ tends to 0, we do not present it here.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed a TF-QKD protocol with discrete-phase-randomized sources both in the code mode
and test mode, and proved its security in the asymptotic case. Our simulation results indicate that, modulating a
few number of discrete phases (say M = 8) in TF-QKD can exhibit performance comparable to that of modulating
infinite number of continuous phases, which is more practical and secure in real-life implemetation of TF-QKD. We
expect our work can provide a valuable reference for researchers to design TF-QKD systems.
Note added. During the preparation of this paper, we find that Guillermo et al. [28] posted a TF-QKD protocol
with discrete phase randomization on arXiv. However, the methodology of security analysis in this paper is different
from [28]. Moreover, [28] modulates different number of phases in the code mode and test mode, while our protocol
modulates the same number of phases in the two modes. Hence, when switching between the code mode and the test
mode, our protocol only needs to modulate the intensities, which is more practical for implementation.
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